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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

Case No. 20030996-CA

MELVIN REDHORSE,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction of theft, a second degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999), in the Seventh Judicial District, San Juan County,
the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Where the prosecutor presented a race- and gender-neutral explanation for his
peremptory challenge of a venire person, did the trial court properly permit the strike?
Alternatively, where the prosecutor articulated both a neutral and a non-neutral
explanation for his strike, but demonstrated that he would have exercised the strike absent
the non-neutral reason, did the trial court properly permit the strike?
'The trial court's conclusion as to whether or not a prima facie case was
established is a legal determination . . . review[ed] for correctness, according it no

particular deference." State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 459 (Utah App. 1993). However,
the trial court's determination as to whether the opponent of the peremptory strike has
proved purposeful discrimination "generally turns on the credibility of the proponent of
the strike and will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous." State v. Higginbotham,
917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996); accord State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,11 5, 41 P.3d
1153. Whether a trial court may permit a strike where the prosecutor articulates both a
neutral and a non-neutral explanation for the strike, but demonstrates that he would have
exercised the strike absent the non-neutral reason, is a question of law. See State v.
Jensen, 2003 UT App 273, f 19, 76 P.3d 188.
2. Was the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial an abuse of discretion
where the trial court determined, after making credibility findings, that no juror formed or
expressed an opinion about defendant's guilt prior to deliberations?
This court "review[s] the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial
under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992).
It reviews for clear error the trial court's underlying findings of the fact. Id.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with theft, a second degree felony. R. 1.
A jury found defendant guilty. R. 86. Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of one
to fifteen years and ordered to pay a fine and restitution. R. 89. The court stayed the
prison sentence and placed defendant on probation, subject to his timely payment of
installments on the fine and restitution. R. 89-90.
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Defendant subsequently moved for a new trial. R. 92. He claimed, among other
things, that certain jurors had discussed his guilt prior to deliberations. R. 93-95. The
court held an evidentiary hearing on the allegation. R. 137-141 (memorandum decision),
147 (transcript of hearing). The court subsequently addressed discrepancies between the
testimony of various witnesses, made credibility determinations and factual findings, and
denied the motion for a new trial. R. 137-142. Defendant timely appealed. R. 143.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The crime. Defendant, a Native American, worked as an artist for Hozhoni
Pottery, owned by Craig Simpson. R. 148:85,92. As part of his work, defendant, along
with other artists, created designs that were incorporated into stencils. R. 148:88-89.
Simpson paid for the art work incorporated into the stencils and for the cutting of the
stencils. Id. Defendant was paid by the hour for his design and stencil work. R. 148:89.
Simpson also paid for the materials used and for the overhead associated with the
manufacturing facility. R. 148:94. When employees left, the stencils remained with the
business. R. 148:89. No royalties were paid for the use of designs. R. 148:97.
Simpson later sold Hozhoni Pottery to Cedar Mesa. R. 148:104. The sale
included approximately eight lines of stencils. R. 148:104, 108. Defendant, however,
took seven of the lines sometime during the transfer of ownership. R. 148:108, 113.
Defendant apparently believed that the designs were his and that he should be paid for
them. R. 148:119.
Simpson later asked defendant to return the stencils. R. 148:128. Defendant
claimed he had thrown them away. Id. Simpson and Joe Lyman of Cedar Mesa spent
3

two weeks reproducing the lines. R. 148:180-81. A third individual was hired to assist.
Id.
Jury selection. During jury selection, defense counsel challenged the prosecutor's
peremptory strike of venire person, Sharon Lee, a Native American, apparently claiming
possible racial motivation in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712
(1986). R. 148:56, 58-62. The trial court discussed the strike with the parties outside the
presence of the jury. R. 148:58.
The court, observing that the prosecutor had "conceded that there was—that he
presumptively should give an explanation" for the strike, asked the prosecutor why he
had stricken Ms. Lee. Id. The prosecutor stated that he did not know Ms. Lee's
ethnicity, but conceded that she appeared to be Native American. R. 148:59. He then
offered three explanations for the strike:
•

"I didn't want to remove the juror entirely for men .. .." Id.

•

"Several of the other jurors I knew or at leas[t] know—have been aware of their
families and different things about them, and . . . sometimes when I know
someone over someone I don't know, I leave them on." Id.

•

"I felt that M[s]. Lee was, ah, reserved, meek, not assertive .. . fairly quiet and it's
my desire to have someone to be assertive and take a stand . . . I think that serves
the prosecution . . . . that's the reason for my taking her off." Id.
The trial judge noted that, at the time the prosecutor exercised his peremptory

strikes, two Native Americans remained on the panel and the prosecutor struck only one.
R. 148:61. The judge observed that he too had noted that Ms. Lee was reserved. Id. He
found that the reason articulated by the prosecutor, i.e., that Ms. Lee was reserved and not
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assertive, was non-discriminatory. R. 148:62. He also found that this was "the real
reason" for the strike and not a pretext. Id.
Alleged juror misconduct Defendant moved for a new trial, offering the affidavit
of a juror who stated that she had overheard two jurors discussing the case on the first
day of trial and that one had said to the other that defendant was guilty. R. 92, 95, 101.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the matter. R. 137, 147. Four jurors
testified, including the juror who claimed that the incident occurred ("Warren"), the two
who allegedly discussed defendant's guilt ("Vigil" and "Young"), and a fourth juror who
testified to another conversation ("Pehrson"). SeeR. 147.
Warren testified that during a recess on the first morning of trial she heard Vigil
tell Young that defendant was guilty. R. 147:6. Pehrson said that she heard Vigil and
Young talking and that one of them said "those templets [templates or stencils] belonged
to that man that bought 'em and that [defendant] was guilty." R. 147:20.
Young denied that she and Vigil had discussed defendant's guilt prior to
deliberations. R. 147:28. She said that she and Vigil were not friends, but did
acknowledge that she and Vigil had a conversation during the break "about my late
husband." R. 147:28,30.
Vigil also testified that she and Young had not discussed defendant's guilt prior to
jury deliberations, but had discussed the death of Young's husband and some life
insurance issues that Young was facing. R. 147:36-37. Asked whether she had any
reason to think that Warren disliked her, Vigil testified that she did. R. 147:42. Vigil
explained that she was an eligibility specialist with Workforce Services and that her
5 .

responsibilities included fraud investigations. R. 147:43. Asked whether she had any
reason, because of her employment, to believe that Warren "might consider [Vigil] to be
responsible for something bad" that happened to Warren, Vigil answered, "Definitely."
Id.
The trial judge filed a memorandum decision denying the motion for a new trial.
R. 137, 141. He detailed his findings, including a finding that the testimony of Vigil and
Young was credible. R. 139. The judge noted that Warren and Pehrson differed as to
where the alleged conversation occurred and that Warren's dislike for Vigil was evident
and did not appear to be based on facts. R. 139-40. He found that "[a]t the time of the
only morning recess on the first day, which is when Warren claimed to have heard a
conversation, no testimony had been presented nor had either lawyer made an opening
statement." R. 140. He found that Warren was not telling the truth and that she was
"motivated by remorse over voting to convict defendant and by her dislike of Vigil." Id.
He found that Pehrson believed that she was telling the truth, but that the conversation to
which she referred "actually occurred after deliberations had begun." R. 140-41.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. No Batson violation occurred. The prosecutor presented a race- and genderneutral explanation for his removal of Ms. Lee, and the trial judge found the explanation
believable. If the prosecutor gave both a neutral and a non-neutral explanation, he
demonstrated that the strike would have been exercised absent the non-neutral
explanation. Thus, the strike did not violate Equal Protection.
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2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion
for a new trial. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether one or
more jurors had formed an opinion regarding defendant's guilt or had discussed
defendant's guilt prior to jury deliberations. After taking testimony, the trial judge found
that the jurors who testified that no conversation occurred were credible and the juror
who testified that the conversation did occur was not credible. The findings, which are
supported by the evidence presented and the demeanor of the juror-witnesses, are not
clearly erroneous.
ARGUMENT
I.
NO BATSON VIOLATION OCCURRED; THE PROSECUTOR
OFFERED A RACE- AND GENDER-NEUTRAL EXPLANATION
FOR HIS THIRD PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it accepted the prosecutor's
explanation regarding the use of a peremptory challenge. Br. Aplt. at 9. The prosecutor
offered a race- and gender-neutral explanation for the strike, and the trial court did not
clearly err when it found that the explanation offered was believable and not a mere
pretext for a non-neutral motivation.
A.

Equal protection limits the use of peremptory challenges.
"Ordinarily, prosecutors have the freedom to base peremptory challenges on any

reasons related to their views of the outcome of the case about to be tried." State v.
Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 462 (Utah App. 1993). However, that privilege is "subject to the
commands of the Equal Protection Clause." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106
7

S.Ct. 1712, 1719 (1986). Thus, "parties in a criminal action are prohibited from engaging
in purposeful racial discrimination in exercising peremptory challenges of potential
jurors." State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1996) (citing Batson, 476 U.S.
at 90, 106 S.Ct. at 1719); accord State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, If 14, 994 P.2d 177.
Likewise, "the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination injury selection on the
basis of gender, or on the assumption that an individual will be biased in a particular case
for no reason other than the fact that the person happens to be a woman or happens to be
a man." J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994); accord
State v. Jensen, 2003 UT App 273, f 13, 76 P.3d 188; State v. Chatwin, 2002 UT App
363, f 6, 58 P.3d 867; State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, H 28, 989 P.2d 503.
"Discrimination injury selection, whether based on race or on gender, causes harm
to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded
from participation in the judicial process." J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140, 114 S.Ct. at 1427. As
a result, "if purposeful discrimination is ultimately found, reversal of the defendant's
conviction is mandated, without regard to the harmlessness of the constitutional error."
State v. Macial, 854 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 100, 106
S.Ct. at 1721).
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B.

To determine whether peremptory strikes comply with equal protection
principles, courts apply a three-step analysis. When a strike is exercised for
both discriminatory and non-discriminatory reasons, courts must further
determine whether the strike would have been exercised absent the improper
motive.
Under Batson and its progeny, trial courts engage in a three-step analysis for

determining whether a party challenging a peremptory strike has demonstrated an equal
protection violation:
[Ojnce the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima
facie case of [ ] discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the
proponent of the strike to come forward with a [neutral] explanation (step two).
If a [neutral] explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step
three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful [ ]
discrimination.
Purkettv. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1770-71 (1995) {per curiam)
(applying the analysis to race-based claims); accord, J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 144-45, 114
S.Ct. at 1429-30; Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (9th Cir.), cert,
denied, 534 U.S. 900, 122 S.Ct. 228 (2001); Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547.
Where the proponent of the strike proffers both a non-neutral and a neutral
explanation, most courts conduct a dual motivation analysis. Dual motivation principles
permit a strike, even where the proponent has articulated a non-neutral reason, if the
proponent can demonstrate that he would have exercised the strike absent that nonneutral reason. See Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 234-235 (3d Cir. 2002), United States
v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 1533 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507,
1530-1532 (8th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421-422 (4th Cir. 1995);
Howard v. Senkonski, 986 F.2d 24, 27-31 (2d Cir. 1993); State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531,
9

544 (Conn. 1999); State v. Gattis, 1996 WL 769328, *4 (Del. Super. 1996) (unpublished)
(attached in Addendum); People v. Hudson, 745 N.E.2d 1246, 1256 (111. 2001); Guzman
v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 246-247 (Texas Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
1.

Establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.
Under the first step of the analysis, the party opposing the strike must "make out a

prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the totality of the relevant
facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94,
106 S.Ct. at 1721; accord J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 144-45, 114 S.Ct. at 1429-30; Colwell, 2000
UT 8, H 18. The purpose behind this first step is "to 'separate meritless claims of
discrimination from those that may have merit.," State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 455
(Utah 1994) (quoting United States v. Malindez, 962 F.2d 332, 334 (4th Cir.), cert,
denied, 506 U.S. 875, 113 S.Ct. 215 (1992)). This step "requires more than simply
showing that one or more minority jurors were peremptorily stricken." State v. Harrison,
805 P.2d 769, 777 (Utah App. 1991), accord Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at 11 18. "[A]s a
general rule, a 'defendant who requests a prima facie finding of purposeful discrimination
is obligated to develop [some] record beyond numbers, in support of the asserted
violation.'" Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 457 (quoting United States v. Brown, 941 F.2d 656, 659
(8th Cir. 1991)); Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at 11 18. And "[wjhile numerical evidence alone
may be sufficient to establish a pattern of peremptory strikes against minority jurors,
numerical e\ idence alone does not necessarily establish a prima facie case." Shepherd,
1999 UT App 305 at 11 30 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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In addition to demonstrating that the excluded panel members "belong to a
cognizable group," the opponent of the strike must show "that there exists 'a strong
likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of their group association
rather than because of any specific bias.'" Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 456 (quoting State v.
Cantu (Cantu II), 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989)); accord Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305
at U 29. "To satisfy this burden, the opponent of the strike must create a record
establishing sufficient evidence to support the allegation of purposeful [ ]
discrimination." State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, H 8, 41 P.3d 1153. When
determining whether the opponent has met his burden, the trial court "must undertake a
'factual inquiry' that 'takes into account all possible explanatory factors' in the particular
case." Batson, 476 U.S. at 95, 106 S.Ct. at 1722 (citations omitted). "For example, a
'pattern' of strikes against [minority] jurors .. . might give rise to an inference of
discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire
examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of
discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723; accord Alvarez, 872
P.2dat455.
The proponent of a strike may, however, waive this step "by not raising it before
explaining the reasons for its peremptory challenges." Jensen, 2003 UT App 273 at f 14
(citations omitted).
2.

Offering a neutral explanation for the peremptory strike.
After an opponent has met his burden to demonstrate a prima facie case or after the

proponent has waived this burden, the proponent "must articulate a neutral explanation
11

related to the particular case to be tried." Batson, 476 U S at 97-98, 106 S Ct at 1724,
accord JEB , 511 U S at 144-45, 114 S Ct at 1429-30 The proponent of a stnke
cannot satisfy step two "by merely denying that he had a discriminatory motive or by
merely affirming his good faith." Purkett, 514 U S at 769, 115 S Ct. at 1771 On the
other hand, this second step "does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even
plausible." Id. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S Ct at
1723 (stating that the "explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a
challenge for cause") All that is required is an explanation that "does not deny equal
protection." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. Unless a discriminatory intent
is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed [ ] neutral."
Id at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This is so
because "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding [] motivation rests with, and never
shifts from, the opponent of the stnke."1 Id.

1

In Batson, the Supreme Court explained that the proponent of the stnke "must give a
'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the
challenges " Batson, 476 U S. at 98 n 20, 106 S Ct at 1724 n 20 (citations omitted) Based
on this language, Utah courts have concluded that the explanation by the proponent of the
stnke "must be '(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tned, (3) clear and reasonably
specific, and (4) legitimate.'" Higginbotham, 917 P 2d at 548 (quoting Cantu II, 778 P 2d at
518) These latter two requirements, however, do not necessitate that the explanation be
logical or persuasive As later explained by the Supreme Court in Purkett, they were simply
"meant to reflate the notion that a prosecutor could satisfy his burden of production by merely
den>ing that he had a discnminatory motive or by merely affirming his good faith " Purkett,
5 14 U S at 769, 115 S Ct at 1771 In other words, "a 'legitimate reason' is not a reason that
makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection " Id
12

3.

Proving purposeful discrimination.
The third step "requires the trial court to decide whether the opponent of the

peremptory challenge has proved purposeful [ ] discrimination." Higginbothanu 917
P.2d at 548; accord Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. In other words, the trial
court must determine whether the proponent's "'explanation for a peremptory challenge
should be believed.,,, State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869 (1991)). "[T]he
question is not whether the prosecutor's explanation for the strike was factually correct,
but whether it was a pretext to disguise a [discriminatory] motive/' Id. at 156; accord
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 549 n.3 (holding that ua peremptory challenge can be made
even for a mistaken reason so long as it is not racially motivated").
In this step, "the persuasiveness of the [proponent's] justification becomes relevant."
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. As observed by the United States Supreme
Court, "[a]t [this] stage, implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be
found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination." Id. "There will seldom be much
evidence bearing on th[is] issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the
attorney who exercises the challenge." Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111
S.Ct. 1859, 1869 (1991). Accordingly, "[i]n determining whether the peremptory
challenge involved purposeful [ ] discrimination, the trial court must undertake a
sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be
available." Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at U 13 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
Factors that may bear on the credibility of the explanation offered include the following
13

"(1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared by the juror in question,
"(2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory examination assuming neither the
trial court nor opposing counsel had questioned the juror,
"(3) singling the juror out for special questioning designed to evoke a certain
response,
"(4) the prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the facts of the case, and
"(5) a challenge based on reasons equally applicable to juror[s] who were not
challenged."
Bowman, 945 P 2d at 155-56 (quoting Cantu II, 778 P 2d at 518-19) (paragraphing
added).
4.

Demonstrating that the strike would have been exercised in the absence of the
improper motivation—dual motivation analysis.
Finally, in the infrequent case where the proponent articulates both a neutral and a

non-neutral explanation for his strike, most courts apply a "dual motivation" analysis
See Gattis v Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 234-235 (3d Cir. 2002), United States v Tokars, 95
F 3d 1520, 1533 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v Darden, 70 F 3d 1507, 1530-1532 (8th
Cir 1995), Jones v Plaster, 57 F 3d 417, 421-422 (4th Cir. 1995), Howard v Senko\xski,
986 F 2d 24, 27-31 (2d Cir. 1993); State v Hodge, 726 A 2d 531, 544 (Conn. 1999),
State v Gattis, 1996 WL 769328, *4 (Del. Super. 1996) (unpublished); People v
Hudson, 745 N.E.2d 1246, 1256 (111. 2001); Guzman v State, 85 S.W 3d 242, 245-246
(Texas Cnm. App. 2002) (en banc). Cf People v Howard, 601 N.Y S 2d 548, 552 (N Y
County Court 1993) Dual motivation principles permit a strike, even where the
proponent has articulated a non-neutral reason, if the proponent can demonstrate that he
would have exercised the stnke absent that non-neutral reason.
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A few courts, however, refuse to consider the proponent's neutral reasons. See Ex
Parte Sockwell, 675 So.2d 38, 40 (Ala. 1995); State v. Lucas, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (Ariz.
2001); Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205, 210 (S.C. 1998). Cf. Rector v. State, 444
S.E.2d 862, 863 (Ga. App. 1994); State v. King, 572 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Wis. App. 1997).
They reason that the proffered non-neutral reason "taints" any other neutral reason for the
strike.
This is an issue of first impression in Utah. See Jensen, 2003 UT App 273 % 19
(noting that "Utah courts have not yet adopted the dual motivation analysis" and
"declining] to consider its adoption" under the circumstances of that case). For reasons
detailed in the subsequent discussion, sound policy favors Utah's adoption of dual
motivation principles, which have been adopted by the strong majority of courts,
including every federal circuit court of appeal that has addressed the question.
a.

Dual motivation analysis
Most courts considering the issue have held that a non-neutral reason for exercising

a peremptory challenge is insufficient, by itself, to show a Batson violation if the
proponent of the strike also articulates a neutral reason. "Dual motivation analysis grants
the proponent of a strike the opportunity to raise an affirmative defense after the
opponent of the strike has established a prima facie case of discrimination." Tokars, 95
F.3d at 1533 (citation omitted). "[T]o prove this affirmative defense, the proponent of
the strike bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike
would have been exercised even in the absence of the discriminatory motivation." Id.
(citation omitted). In other words, having articulated both a neutral and a non-neutral
15

explanation, the proponent "bears the burden of proof to persuade the trier that the
challenges would have been exercised for race [or gender] neutral reasons even if race [or
gender] had not been a factor." Howard, 986 F 2d at 24.
b.

Taint analysis
Several state courts, however, have held that any non-neutral reason for striking a

juror taints the entire jury selection process. "Once a discriminatory reason has been
uncovered

this reason taints any other neutral reason for the strike " See Lucas, 18

P 3d at 163 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Once a prosecutor has
articulated any discriminatory purpose for a strike, removal of the juror taints the
proceeding and requires reversal of any ensuing conviction. Id Whether the prosecutor
would have stricken the juror in the absence of the discriminatory purpose is irrelevant.
See id
c.

Policy considerations
Dual motivation analysis makes sense as a matter of policy The purpose for

peremptory challenges is to seat a fair and impartial jury. See y £ 5 , 511 U S at 137 n 8,
114 S Ct at 1426 n.8 ("only legitimate interest... in the exercise of [a party's]
peremptory challenges is securing a fair and impartial jury"). That purpose is thwarted
if, once a prosecutor expresses a non-neutral motivation for striking a juror, the tnal court
has no choice but to seat the challenged juror, no matter how legitimate and compelling
the prosecutor's other objections.
Yet, courts that have rejected dual motivation analysis have not explained what
action a tnal judge should take where a proffered explanation for peremptory stakes
16

includes both neutral and non-neutral bases. Rather, they have simply reversed
convictions concluding that the jury selection was "tainted " Important questions remain
unanswered. Must the tnal judge immediately seat the juror, effectively jeopardizing the
victim's and the people's interest in a fair tnal, because the prosecutor has voiced a
discriminatory motive? Should the judge, instead, release the venire and begin selection
proceedings anew? What course should the tnal judge take to avoid reversal? Courts
adopting taint analysis have not addressed and apparently have not considered these
questions. The lack of clear answers for them suggests the weakness of taint analysis.
Further, courts adopting taint analysis inaccurately reason that dual motivation
analysis erodes Batson's protection of the equal protection interest. Dual motivation
reasoning does not undermine equal protection. "[Djual motivation analysis has its roots
in equal protection cases which hold that an action motivated in part by an impermissible
reason will nonetheless be valid if the same action would have been taken in the absence
of the impermissible motivation." People v Hudson, 745 N E 2d 1246, 1256 (111. 2001)
(citing Tokars, 95 F 3d at 1533 n.4).
The Second Circuit, the first court to apply dual motivation analysis to peremptory
stnkes, looked to the Supreme Court's analysis of pve-Batson equal protection cases,
including Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976), Village of Arlington
Heights v Metropolitan Housing Dev Corp, 429 U S. 252, 97 S Ct. 555 (1977), and Mt
Healthy City Sch Dist Bd ofEduc v Doyle, 429 U S 274, 97 S Ct. 568 (1977) In
those cases, the Supreme Court articulated some guiding analytical pnnciples.
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(1) "Racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause requires a racially
discriminatory purpose." Guzman v. State, 85 SW.3d 242, 250 (Texas 2002)
(en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (discussing the
above-cited pre-Batson equal protection cases).
(2) "A plaintiff need not prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially
discriminatory purposes; rather the test is whether a discriminatory purpose has
been a motivating factor in the decision." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
(3) If the plaintiff shows that a discriminatory purpose motivated a decision in
part, the defendant then bears the burden of establishing that he would have
made the same decision if the discriminatory purpose had not been considered
or had not existed." Id.
Under dual-motivation analysis, then, a peremptory challenge cannot stand where
the prosecutor would not have made the decision, absent a discriminatory purposes, even
where the discriminatory purpose is only one—even a small one—of his motivations. But
where a prosecutor would have stricken the juror absent any discriminatory purpose, the
strike can stand. Consequently, this analysis does not to jeopardize equal protection.
Because dual motivation analysis is consistent with equal protection precedent and, at the
same time, protects the people's interest in a fair trial, this Court should adopt the analysis
for review of cases involving both neutral and non-neutral motivations for peremptory
challenges.
C.

The prosecutor gave a neutral and nondiscriminatory reason for his
peremptory challenge: he removed a venire person because she appeared timid
and not assertive.
The prosecutor apparently waived any requirement that defendant make a prima

facie showing of racial discrimination. R. 148:58 (court stating that the prosecutor
•'conceded" that he "presumptively should give an explanation" for striking Ms. Lee).
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The trial court therefore properly asked the prosecutor why he exercised his third
peremptory strike to remove her Id
The prosecutor responded, "I didn't want to take off, ah, to remove the juror entirely
for men." R 148 59 The meaning of that statement is not clear. After for-cause
challenges, only two males remained on the venire. R. 68. Defendant exercised his first
peremptory challenge to strike one of them. Id The prosecutor may have feared that
staking the only remaining male from the jury would have subjected him to a challenge
for gender discrimination. The desire to avoid a Batson challenge is not, of itself, an
impermissibly discriminatory motive.
In any case, the prosecutor gave two alternative reasons for the strike. First, he
stated that he had some familiarity with the residents of his community, including some
of the jurors or their families, and preferred a "known quantity" to an "unknown
quantity" when choosing a jury. R. 148:60. It is permissible and non-discriminatory to
strike a juror about whom the prosecutor knows little or nothing, but to retain a juror
whom the prosecutor knows better and who therefore presents less uncertainty and
potentially less risk. See Commonwealth v Eddings, 721 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Pa. Super
1998) (stating that prosecutor's "hope[] to seat juror with whom he had been acquainted"
was "legitimate race neutral reason[] for his strikes"). The trial court did not make a
credibility determination as to this explanation.
Second, the prosecutor explained that he struck Ms. Lee because she was unduly
reserved. Id He felt that she was not sufficiently assertive and would be unwilling to
take a stand Id He implied that she would therefore be less likely to convict. Id The
19

tnal judge, observing that he too had noted Ms Lee's reserved demeanor, made an
explicit determination that the prosecutor had presented an honest explanation for the
strike and that the explanation was not a pretext for a discriminatory motive R
148 61-62 Consequently, the court allowed the strike to stand. Id
Therefore, even should this Court conclude that the prosecutor's ambiguous
statement that he "didn't want to . . remove the juror entirely for men" constitutes
impermissible gender discrimination, this Court should conclude, under dual motivation
analysis, that the prosecutor gave an alternative reason that was race and gender neutral
The tnal court did not err when it found that the neutral explanation was non-pretextual
Because the prosecutor would have stncken Ms. Lee for this neutral reason, apart from
any consideration of race or gender, the stnke was non-discnminatory.
II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL; THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ERR IN EITHER ITS
CREDIBILITY FINDINGS OR ITS FINDING THAT NO JUROR
MISCONDUCT OCCURRED
Defendant claims that the tnal court erred when it denied his motion for a new
tnal. Br Aplt. at 12. This Court reviews the denial of a motion for a new tnal under an
abuse of discretion standard. See State v Thomas, 830 P 2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992) It
reviews for clear error the factual findings underlying the denial. Id To prevail on this
claim, defendant must therefore show that the tnal court clearly erred when it found
untrue allegations that two of the jurors had discussed defendant's guilt pnor to jury
deliberations
20

Rule 17(k), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides the following guidelines:
"At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are
sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse
among themselves . . . and not to form or express an opinion [on any subject of the tnal]
until the case is finally submitted to them."
"For a juror to prejudge the case is serious misconduct." Roma v. Ford Motor Co.,
122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 154 (Cal. App. 2002), cert, granted and judgment vacated on
other grounds by 123 S.Ct. 2072 (2003). At least in some circumstances, juror
misconduct raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. See State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277,
280 (Utah 1985) (prosecution mingled and conversed with jurors during recess); State v.
Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah App. 1992) (victim engaged in conversation with juror
during recess).
In this case, the trial court held a hearing on the allegation that jurors Vigil and
Young had discussed defendant's guilt and that at least one of them had formed and
expressed an opinion about defendant's guilt before hearing all of the evidence. R. 147.
Following testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the court heard argument on the issue.
R. 147:47-54. The court concluded that if the allegation was true, defendant had likely
suffered prejudice. R. 147:54-55. The court, however, indicated that the decisive
question was whether or not the allegation was true. Id.
A few days later, the court issued a memorandum decision on the matter. R. 137.
It concluded that the allegation was not true. R. 139-40. The court concluded that
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Warren, who made the allegation, was untruthful and that she was motivated by remorse
over voting to convict defendant and by her dislike of Vigil. R. 140.
The judge also noted another matter undermining Warren's credibility. He
observed that Warren testified that the incident occurred during the only recess on the
first morning of trial. R. 137, 140. He found it unlikely that a conversation about
defendant's guilt would have taken place during that recess because, at that point, no
evidence had been offered and opening statements had not even been made. Id.
Other evidentiary hearing testimony undermined Warren's credibility. Vigil
testified that Warren had reason to believe that Vigil, who conducted fraud investigations
as part of her employment, had been responsible for "something bad" that had happened
to Warren. R. 147:43.
Moreover, the trial court, explaining its observation of Warren's demeanor, stated
that "Warren's dislike for Vigil was evident and did not appear to be based on the facts/'
R. 139.
Based on the evidence presented and on its own observations of demeanor, the
trial court did not clearly err when it found Vigil and Young to be credible, but Warren to
be not credible. It did not clearly err when it found that the alleged misconduct did not
occur. It therefore did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion for a
new trial based on the alleged misconduct.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
BARRON, Judge
*1 The defendant, Robert Allen Gattis, was
convicted of first degree murder and related offenses
in the shooting death of his girlfriend, Shirley Y
Slay This Court sentenced Gattis to death On direct
appeal, Gattis' convictions and sentence were
affirmed Gattis v State DelSupr, 637 A 2d 808
(1094) Gattis then filed a motion for postconviction
relief, which this Court denied Gattis v State,
Del Super, CrA Nos IN90-05-1017 to 1019-R2,
IN90-05- 1106 & U07-R2, Barron, J (Dec 28,
1995)
On appeal of the denial of Gattis' postconviction
motion the Delaware Supreme Court, sitting en banc,
heard oral arguments and remanded the matter to this
Court to make factual findings and conclusions of
law regarding two issues Gattis v State Del Supr,
No 37 1996. Holland, J (Oct 15, 1996) (ORDER)
The first issue, dealing with the State's theory of the
homicide, requires a hearing and will be resolved by
the Court in a separate opinion |FM j This is the
Court's opinion on the second issue, which is whether
the State improperly used one of its peremptory
challenges during jury selection to exclude a potential
juror for gender-related reasons in violation of the

Equal Protection Clause and JJ1_B__\ Matwma i\ ui
TB^2\\ l_ 5_J2_1J_I4_S CtJ.4L9_Qc>04j This i* an
issue of first impression in Delaware Ha< mg
carefully reviewed the parties' submissions on this
issue, the Court concludes that the State did not
violate either the spirit or the letter of the law during
the selection of Gams' jury

FM Because a hearing is required for only
one of the two matters on remand this Court
requested permission from the Supreme
Court to issue separate opinions on the two
matters The Supreme Court agreed to the
bifurcation, advising this Court to issue an
opinion on the gender issue on or betore
December 13 1996, and an opinion on the
theory of the homicide on or betore
February 14, 1997

ISSUE GENDER-BASED DISCRIWINA TIONIV
JURY SELECTION
Gattis argues that during jury selection the State
improperly exercised one of its peremptory
challenges to remove prospective juror Wilfred
Moore from the jury panel Specifically, Gattis
alleges that the State removed Moore for genderrelated reasons in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause and J E B \ Alabama e\ id TB, >P t b
127, 114 SCt 1419 (1994) In response, the State
argues that even though one of the prosecutors
reasons for the challenge was based on gender the
other reason was Moore's reluctance to impose the
death penalty For this reason, the State contends that
the paramount reason for the strike was genderneutral and that this Court should so find
STANDARD OF REVIEW [F\21

\\2
The Court makes the following
procedural note Gattis' contention regarding
jury selection is before the Court on a
remand of an appeal of this Court's denial oi
Gattis' motion for postconviction relief filed
pursuant to Super C t (. rim R 61 In its order
of remand, the Supreme Court directs this
Court to "consider and decide [the jury
selection] contention in the first instance "
Gattis v State DelSupr, CrA No 37
1996, Holland, J (October 15 1996)
(ORDER) (emphasis added) Based on this
direction, the Court does not subject Gattis'
argument to the standard procedural detaults
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of Rule_6_lLQ, but rather addresses the issue
on its merits
Under Rule 61, "any claim not asserted in
the proceedings leading to the judgment of
conviction" is barred unless the defendant
can show cause for his default and actual
prejudice
Super Ct Cnm R
61(0(3),
Flamer \ State Del Supr, 585 \ 2d ""16.
"4" (19QU), Johnson v State Del Supr , 460
\ 2 J 53() 540 (1983) "Cause" for a
procedural default ordinarily requires a
showing of some external impediment
preventing counsel from constructing or
raising a claim. Younger v State, Del Supr,
vSO A 2d 552 (1990), Flamet v State. 585
A 2d at ""*6 Gattis' conviction was affirmed
on February 28, 1994 See Gattis v State
Del Supr , 63" A 2d 808 810(1994) Gattis'
petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court was denied October 3, 1994
Gams v Delaware. 115 S Ct 132 (1994)
The JEB decision was announced April
19 1994 JEB v \labama ex lei TB 511
I -> 1^1 (J?94J ^ the instant motion were
considered under the procedural default of
Rule
61(0(3),
Gattis
could
have
demonstrated that these facts constituted an
external impediment which prevented his
counsel from presenting the JEB claim at
trial or on direct appeal. However, he could
not set forth concrete allegations of actual
prejudice to avoid the procedural default.
} outlet \ State. 580 A 2d at 556
Gattis might also have moved for relief from
the procedural bar on the grounds that it not
apply to 'a colorable claim that there was a
miscarriage of justice because of a
constitutional violation that undermined the
fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or
fairness or the proceedings leading to the
judgment of conviction." Super Ct Cnm R
()lu)p) In light of this Court's finding in
the instant opinion that the State did not
impermissibly exercise its peremptory
challenges, Gattis would not have succeeded
with this claim.

The United States Supreme Court has established a
three-step analysis to be used to test the
constitutionality of peremptory challenges allegedly
based on invidious racial discrimination Batson \
Kifituckx 4~6 ( >> "9 94(19^6), Robertson v State
Del Supr , 6^0 \ 2d 10S4. 1088-89 (199^) In J E B
\ Alabama e\ iel TB the Court held that the
Batson analysis also applies to claims of gender-

Paee 2

related discrimination in jury selection 1J4 s c t at
L4.29-2P
To establish such a claim, the defendant mubt first
make a prima facie case of discrimination 'bv
showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives
rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose '
Batson 4"6 L b at 94, Robatson \ Stutt 6 ; 0 \ 2d
at I0fr9 Second, if the prima facie case has been
established the burden shifts to the State to articulate
a gender-neutral explanation, which must not be
pretextual Batson 476 U S at 9^-98 J LB 114
S Ct at 14 29 This step requires the State to offer a
neutral reason, which is "not a reason that makes
sense, but a reason that does not deny equal
protection.' Putkett v Elan 115 S C t T69 r H
(1995] (per curiam) Finally, the trial court must
determine whether the defendant has carried his
burden of proving purposeful discrimination Id That
is, "the trial court must undertake a factual inquiry'
that 'takes into account all possible explanatory
factors' in the particular case" Batson at 95, quoting
\le\ander\ Louisiana 405 L S 625 630(19^2)
*2 Throughout the analysis, "the ultimate burden of
persuasion regarding racial [or gender] motivation
rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the
strike " Put kett \ Elem 115 S Ct. at P " !
The analysis changes somewhat when a prosecutor
offers both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory
reasons for the strike For Batson claims, four circuits
have adopted the so-called dual motivation analysis
\\r\3\ See Wallace \ Uomson 8" r- 3d \r 1 (11 th
C ir 1996) (applying dual motivation where
prosecutor stated that race was one factor he
considered in the exercise of peremptory strikes),
L nited Stares \ Darden ^0 V M IMF uSth C ir
1995) (applying dual motivation where prosecutor
struck on basis of youth, inexperience, and alleged
young black female tendency to show sympathy for
individuals involved with narcotics), cert denied 116
SCt 1449, and cert denied, 116 S Ct 256" (1996),
Jones- \ Plastet, 5" \ 3d 4 1 7 (4th _( i_r__ l W j
(applying dual motivation but remanding to district
court for clarification of findings regarding whether
the strike was exercised for a discriminatory purpose
and whether it would have been exercised in the
absence of discriminatory purpose), I low at d v
Senkowski 9S6 V 2d 24 (2d Cir 1993) (applying dual
motivation analysis to prosecutor's pre-Batson
statements)

F-N3 The Court notes that 'resort to dual
motivation will rarelv be necessary
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[because] by now, no competent prosecutor
or defense attorney is unaware of the fact
that strikes on the basis of race or gender are
prohibited." United States v To Lin. 95 F.3d
1520. 1534 (11th Or. 19%). Tokars' trial,
like Gams', took place before it was clear
whether Batson would be extended to
eender.

In United Status v Tokars. 95 F.3d 1520 (11th Or.
1996), the dual motivation analysis was held
applicable to J.E.B. claims, that is, claims that the
State used its peremptory strikes to exclude potential
jurors on the basis of gender. Under the dual
motivation test, after the defendant has made a prima
facie showing of discrimination, the State may raise
the affirmative defense that the strike would have
been exercised on the basis of the race- neutral
reasons and in the absence of the discriminatory
motive. Wallace v. Morrison, 37 F.3d at 1274, citing
Howard v. Senkowski. 986 F.2d at 30. The State bears
the burden of making this showing by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. If the court
concludes that the State has made such a showing,
the peremptory challenge is not subject to
constitutional attack. United States v. Darden, 70
F.3dat 1531.
Both the Batson test and the dual motivation analysis
require that the court make factual findings regarding
the state's use of its peremptory challenges. However,
under Batson, the burden remains with the defendant
to show discriminatory purpose, Purkett v. Elem. 115
S.Ct. at P 7 1 , whereas under dual motivation
analysis, the burden shifts to the state if it raises the
affirmative defense. Wallace v. Morrison, 87 F.3d at
1274. Despite this difference, the court's fact-finding
function in the final step is the same under both tests,
and the cases using the Batson test provide guidelines
which are also useful for the final step of the dual
motivation analysis. For this reason, the Court relies
on both Batson cases and dual motivation cases in
analyzing the case at bar.
FACTS
*3 During jury selection in Gattis' capital murder
trial, the State used one of its peremptory challenges
to strike Wilfred Moore from the panel. Prior to the
challenge, the Court engaged in the following
colloquy with Mr. Moore:
Q: If the facts and circumstances so warrant, could
you recommend a sentence of death?
A: Yes, sir, I could.
Q: All right. Well, let's go back to that. If the facts
Copr. c West 2003 No Cla:

and circumstances so warrant, could vou
recommend a sentence of life imprisonment'*
A: Yes, sir, I could.
Q: All right. Now. you did indicate that you would
follow the Court's instructions on the law whether
you agreed with that law or not.
A: Right.
Q: Taking those instructions in mind, then, and
taking into account all the facts and circumstances,
now, if the facts and circumstances so warrant and
if the Court's instructions so permit, could you
recommend a sentence of death?
A: It's like going to war. I don't know if I - you
know, until the time comes, truly in my heart
would I know if I could bring a bullet up there. I
don't know until the time comes.
Q: Okay. Philosophically, generally, you're not
opposed to the death penalty?
A: I believe in the death penalty, but I don't know
if I could be the one to say, yes, sentence this
defendant to death until the time comes.
Q: Okay. Would you give it a conscientious effort
to apply the law and to follow your duties as a
juror?
A: Yes, sir, I would.
The Court then asked Mr. Moore to step out of the
courtroom, and the prosecutor requested that Moore
be struck for cause. The prosecutor, Mark Bunitsky,
Esquire, argued that Moore was uncomfortable being
asked to vote for death and unsure of his ability to do
so. After hearing arguments from both the State and
the defense, this Court concluded that Moore's
responses did not meet the Witherspoon standard and
therefore declined to exclude him for cause. See
Witherspoon v. Illinois. 391 I .S. 510 (1968). The
State men entered its challenge.
After Mr. Moore was excused, the prosecutor
requested the Court's permission to make a record of
his reasons for the strike. He offered two reasons for
his actions:
Number one, I believe that this juror was very, very
conservative in his application of the possible
application of the death penalty. He answered very
quickly yes to the possibility of imposing a life
sentence under the appropriate facts and
circumstances, yet, to our belief, had a very
difficult time in answering whether or not he could
impose the death penalty under the appropriate
circumstances. He seemed to be very, very
conservative in the application of the death penalty.
Number two, he is an older gentleman and we
have, I believe, four or five older gentlemen on the
jury panel already. And I would suggest that it's the
State's point of view that we would prefer to have
to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works
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some more women on the jury
This Court then made the following findings
All right I would just observe again for the record
that in light of his responses, it's not surprising at
all that the State utilized a challenge, and I'm
convinced beyond any doubt whatsoever that that
challenge was not predicated upon racial motives
*4 At the time Mr Moore was struck from the panel,
four men and three women had been selected for
Gattis' jury The State had used four of its peremptory
challenges to remove two men and two women. After
Moore was removed, the State challenged two men
and three women (one of whom was a potential
alternate juror). In its final form, the jury consisted of
six men and six women. Of the four alternate jurors,
one was a man, three were women.
DISCUSSION
In Batson \ Kentutk\, 476 I S at 87. the United
States Supreme Court stated that "[t]he harm from
discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that
inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to
touch the entire community Selection procedures
that purposefully exclude black persons from junes
undermine public confidence in the fairness of our
system of justice." The Batson Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause forbids a prosecutor to
peremptorily challenge jurors solely on account of
race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group
will be unable to impartially consider the prosecution
against a black defendant. [FN4] Id at 95.

F\4
The principle that preventing
members of a particular group of people
from serving on juries is unconstitutional is
a well-established principle in equal
protection jurisprudence. In Strauderv Heir
I'lnnma 100 I S 303 (1880), the Court
held that a State denies a black defendant
equal protection of laws when it puts him on
trial before a jury from which members of
his race have been purposefully excluded.
The Strauder Court explained that the
central concern of the recently ratified
Fourteenth Amendment was to put an end to
governmental discrimination on account of
race I no I S at 306-307

InJFB
Uahcuna ,\ ul fB 114 S ( t at 1419,
the Court was asked to decide whether the Equal
Protection Clause forbids intentional discrimination
on the basis of sender The state had used its

Pase4

peremptory strikes to remove nearly all the men from
the jury in a paternity suit on the grounds that men
would be more receptive to the putative father while
the women would be more sympathetic to the child's
mother Id at 1426 The Court concluded that such a
practice violates equal protection, and held that
gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy tor
juror competence and impartiality, especially where
the discrimination perpetuates invidious stereotypes
about men and women. |F\>] 11-4 S C t at 1421-22

F\5
Since Reed v Reed 404 I S
(19M K the Supreme Court has subjected
gender-based classifications to "heightened
scrutiny" in light of the danger that
government policies which purport to be
based on reasonable concerns may in fact be
reflective of overboard stereotypes about
gender J LB, 114 SCt at 1424 Lnder
equal protection analysis, the heightened
scrutiny standard requires that gender-based
classifications be supported by "an
exceedingly persuasive justification" to
withstand constitutional scrutiny l_d_ at
1425.
InJEB, the State asserted that its decision
to strike almost all the males from the jury
had a reasonable basis in the perception that
men might be more sympathetic to the
putative father in a paternity suit, and
women might be more sympathetic to the
mother. Id at 1426 The Court refused to
accept as a defense the same type of
stereotype which the law itself condemns
Id No such invidious stereotype has been
advanced or suggested in the case at bar

Based on the holding mJEB Gattis argues that he
was denied equal protection of laws when the State
used one of its peremptory strikes to remove Moore
from the panel The applicable test to evaluate this
claim is the dual motivation analysis _LKM>1 ^
Wallace v Morrison, S7 I- 3d at 12^4, ( nited Sfr/'c ^
v Tnkars 95 \r 5d at 1520 Dual motivation analysis
grants the ptoponent of the allegedly discriminatory
strike the opportunity to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the strike would have been
exercised even in the absence of the discriminatory
motivation L F\"| Wallace v Motnson T f-3d at
127S

h\6 Like other cases based on the Equal
Protection Clause, the purpose of both
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Batson and J.E.B. is to prevent intentional,
invidious discrimination against certain
cognizable groups. As in other areas of
equal protection jurisprudence, an action
motivated in part by an impermissible
reason will nonetheless be valid if the same
action would have been taken in the absence
of the impermissible motivation. Mt.
Healthy Cm Sell. Bd. ofEJuc. v Doyle. 429
U.S. 2~4(19~),

FN 7, In the case at bar, the need for a prima
facie showing of intentional discrimination
is obviated by the fact that the State in effect
concedes that gender played a part in its
decision. Wallace v. Morrison. 87 F.3d at
1275. Sec also Hernandez v. Sew York. 500
U.S. 352. 359(1991); Johnson v. Vazquez. 3
F.3d 132", 1329 (9th Or. 1993), cert,
denied, 114S.O. 1838(1994).

The State asserts that its primary reason for striking
Moore was his unwillingness to impose a penalty of
death and that the prosecutor would have challenged
him for that reason alone. In evaluating this assertion,
the Court must consider "all relevant circumstances."
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 96. In other words,
this decision entails a "Tactual inquiry' that 'takes into
account all possible explanatory factors' in the
particular case." Id. at 95, quoting Alexander v.
Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625. 630 (1972). See also
Hernandez v. Sew )ork, 500 U.S. at 363 (observing
that an "invidious discriminatory purpose may often
be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts.")
*5 Considering the totality of the circumstances
entails a review of the number of men and women on
the panel as well as the number of strikes used by the
State to remove both men and women. The Court
notes that in Batson the jury was all white and that in
J.E.B., the jury was all women. [FN8] Even in
extreme cases such as these, a showing of disparate
impact does not in itself violate equal protection
unless the defendant can show that the exclusion was
purposeful. Hernandez v. Sew York, 500 U.S. at 360.
On the other hand, when intentional discrimination is
the motivating factor, equal protection is offended at
the exclusion of even one juror on the basis of race or
gender. J.E.B. at 1428, n 13.

FN8. In Batson, after certain potential
jurors had been excused for cause, the
prosecutor used his peremptory challenges

to strike all four remaining black people
from the venire, resulting in an all-white
jury for the trial of a black defendant. In
J.E.B., after the court excused three potential
jurors for cause, the prosecutor used nine of
its ten peremptory strikes to remove nine of
the remaining ten men. and the defendant
used one of its peremptory strikes to remo\e
the other man, resulting in a jury composed
only of women. J E.B. 114S.Ct. at 1421-22.

Although neither the Batson test nor the dual
motivation test requires a showing of disparate
impact, the quantifiable effect of a state actor's
actions is an implied factor in equal protection
analysis. For example, in Hernandez v Sew York, the
Court stated that "[i]f a prosecutor articulates a basis
for a peremptory challenge that results in the
disproportionate exclusion of members of a certain
race the trial judge may consider that fact as evidence
that the prosecutor's stated reason constitutes a
pretext for racial discrimination." 500 U.S. at 363
(emphasis added). See also United States v. Darden,
7Q F.3d at 1530, n. 8 (reviewing the government's use
of its challenges to dispel allegations of
discrimination).
Although disparate impact alone is not sufficient to
establish a violation of equal protection, impact may
be considered as one of the relevant factors, along
with the manner in which the State exercised its
strikes throughout the jury selection process. In the
case at bar, the facts do not show that the prosecutor's
actions had a disparate impact on the make-up of the
jury or that the prosecution used its peremptory
challenges in a discriminatory way. To the contrary,
at the time Mr. Moore was struck from the panel,
four men and three women had been selected for
Gattis' jury. The State had used four of its challenges
to remove two men and two women. After Moore
was removed, the State used two strikes to remove
men and three strikes to remove women. In its final
form, the jury consisted of six men and six women.
Of the four alternate jurors, one was a man, three
were women. On these facts, the Court does not
discern any intent to discriminate against men on the
part of the prosecution. As the Hernandez court
stated, "[ejqual protection analysis turns on the
intended
consequences
of
government
classifications." 500 U.S. at 359-60. Viewing the
consequences of the prosecutor's actions throughout
jury selection, this Court finds nothing to suggest that
the prosecutor intended to exclude men from Gattis'
jury.
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Another relevant aspect of the mquirv is the
prosecutors credibility The court's finding as to
intent is a 'pure issue ol fact," ILmanck. \ \LW
)ork M)Q { ^ at 365, which 'largely will turn on
evaluation of credibility ' Barson 4~6 L s at 9y n
21 The Supreme Court has made it clear that the trial
judge is best suited to make this determination
*6 In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry the
decisive question will be whether counsel's raceneutral [or gender-neutral] explanation for a
peremptory challenge should be believed There
will seldom be much evidence bearing on that
issue, and the best evidence often will be the
demeanor of the attorney who exercises the
challenge 4s with the state of mind of a juror
e\aluation oj the prosecutor's state of mind based
on demeanor and credibility lies 'peculiarly within
a trial judge s province "
fftniandtz \ \ew )oik ^00 [ S at 365 citing
Hdmunzht v Witt. 469 I ^ 412, 428 (1984)
(emphasis added) These observations, which were
made in regard to the Batson test, also pertain to the
final step in the dual motivation test wherein the
Court must determine whether the State has shown
that it would have exercised the strike solely on the
basis of the nondiscriminatory reasons Wallace v
Morrison 986 F 2d at 30
In the case at bar, the prosecutor stated that he
challenged Moore because of Moore's ambivalence
regarding capital punishment All of the discussion
about Moore addressed this issue and Moore's ability
to impose a sentence of death [F\9] There is
nothing in the record which indicates that the
prosecution was driven by invidious gender-based
stereotypes Furthermore, this Court observed on the
record that 'in light of his responses, it's not
surprising at all that the State utilized a challenge,
and I'm conv inced beyond any doubt whatsoever that
that challenge was not predicated upon racial
motives ' In other words, the Court accepted the
States proffered rationale for challenging Moore
because of his ambivalence about the death penalty
Such ambivalence is an appropriate reason for a
peremptory strike in a capital case Ste Brown \
\nnh Camhna, 479 L S 940 (1986)(Q'Connor, J,
concurring in the denial of certiorari), Baynard v
State Del Supr, 518 A 2d 6b2. 685-86 (1990) Based
on a totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that
the State has carried its burden of showing that the
prosecutor would have challenged Moore even in the
absence of any gender-related reason

Paee 6

Epstein Esquire, are both experienced trial
attornevs who have always impressed the
Court with their forthrightness and candor
They take their responsibilities as otficers ot
the court with seriousness and fidelity Both
prosecutors are considered to be credible
and reliable professionals While Mr
Bunitsky offered the States rationale tor its
challenge of Mr Moore the prosecutors
conferred with each other throughout the
jury selection process

In regard to the prosecutor's gender-based
motivation, the Court is satisfied that this
consideration was de minimus The prosecutor stated
that several men had already been selected and that
he wanted to select a few more women On its face
this statement indicates that the prosecutor was tr\ mg
to seat a jury with a 'diverse and representative
character, [which] must be maintained partly as
assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly
because sharing in the administration of justice is a
phase of civic responsibility '" J E B at 1424, quoting
Ta\lor\ Louisiana 419 1 S ^22, > 0-M (19^) In
light of the fact that four men had already been
selected foi Gattis' jury when Moore was challenged,
it is not plausible that the prosecutor's stated desire
for a mix of men and women was a pretext for a
desire to exclude men because of "invidious archaic
and overbroad stereotypes" JEB at 1422 In fact
viewing the statement in the context of the Court's
colloquy with Moore regarding capital punishment
and counsels' arguments regarding Moore s suitability
under Witherspoon the brief reference to gender
seems more like an afterthought than a 'substantial
part of the motivation' for the strike \\ tUact \
Morrison 87 P Mat 12^4
*7 The J EB Court found that when prosecutors
exercise peremptory challenges 'in reliance on
gender stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce
prejudicial views of the relative abilities of women
and men" 114 S i t at 142^ This Court finds no
evidence that the prosecutor in the case at bar relied
on such unfair and outdated stereotypes Based on a
totality of the circumstances, this Court is satisfied
that gender was at most a de minimus factor in the
State's decision to challenge Moore and that the State
would have challenged Moore even in the absence of
any discriminatory reason
COi\CLLSlON

t_N9 The two prosecutors assigned to this
case Mark Bunitsky Esquire and Marsha

For all the toregomg reasons the defendants motion
tor a new trial on the grounds of improper use ot
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peremptory challenges is hereby DENIED
It Is So ORDERED
1996 WL 769328 (Del Super)
END OF DOCUMENT
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